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Abstract 
In this paper we introduce an intrusion detection system for 
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against Domain Name System 
(DNS). Our system architecture consists of two most important 
parts: a statistical preprocessor and a neural network classifier. 
The preprocessor extracts required statistical features in a short-
time frame from traffic received by the target name server. We 
compared three different neural networks for detecting and 
classifying different types of DoS attacks. The proposed system 
is evaluated in a simulated network and showed that the best 
performed neural network is a feed-forward backpropagation 
with an accuracy of 99%. 
 
Keywords: Network security, Domain name system, Denial of 
service,  Neural Network. 
1. Introduction 
The Domain Name System (DNS) is one of the important 
elements of the Internet infrastructure which provides 
name to address mapping services. Attackers try to exploit 
this fact in order to achieve an unauthorized access and 
provide unavailability of communication to legitimate 
users. Therefore, it is very critical for network 
administrators to identify the variety of attack techniques 
in order to overcome them. 
 
From the point of view of traffic analysis, Kambourakis et 
al. [1] proposed a practical scheme that has the ability to 
distinguish between authentic and falsified DNS replies. 
Their scheme monitors DNS traffic and based on the one-
to-one mapping of DNS request and responses alerts 
security supervisors when the targeted name server 
receives responses that have not been sent out any 
corresponding requests previously. The main problem of 
their system is the rapid increase of database size in cases 
of high traffic rate. Wang et al. [2] also attempts to 
understand anomalous behaviors of name servers by 
mining DNS traffic. They focused on the query amount 
and the correlation between clients and servers for 
detecting anomalous behaviors of name servers. Their 
method is suffering from the lack of the potential bias in 
the anomaly detection and also the causes of anomalous 
behaviours have not been pointed. 
 
The aim of this article is to exploit the learning ability of 
neural networks to detect DoS attacks against DNS. 
Therefore, our objectives are to generate required data for 
different attack scenarios and to evaluate three of the best 
performed neural networks for detection and classification 
in Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) which are Back-
Propagation (BP), Radial Basis Function (RBF), and Self-
Organizing Maps (SOM) neural networks. 
2. DoS attacks against DNS 
Two of the most common DoS attacks against DNS are 
direct DoS attacks and amplification attacks. For the direct 
DoS attacks, attacker tries to overwhelm the server by 
sending an excess traffic from single or multiple sources. 
Based on the measurement of DNS during the periods of 
distributed DoS attacks in [3], a huge number of query 
packets were received by the target name server. Therefore, 
the name servers flooded by DoS attacks will experience 
packet loss and can not always respond to every DNS 
request. The percentage of lost incoming DNS requests due 
to the excessive load is based on the DoS attack intensity 
[4]. Wang et al. [2] also points that the packet size of DNS 
data flow is small and the message amount is little that 
make the process of anomalous behaviours detection more 
difficult. 
 
On the other hand, attackers establish the most 
sophisticated and modern type of DoS attacks known as 
amplification attacks to increase the effect of normal DoS 
attacks. According to [5], the attacks against TLD (Top-
Level-Domain) name servers are all forms of DNS 
amplification attacks. The reason behind the name of 
amplification attack is that the attacker makes use of the 
fact that small queries can generate much larger UDP 
packets in response [6]. Nowadays, the attackers use the 
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recent extension of DNS protocol (RFC 2671) to magnify 
the amplification factor. For example a 60 bytes DNS 
request can be answered with responses of over 4000 bytes. 
This yields an amplification factor of more than 60. Several 
researchers have studied the effects of reflected 
amplification attacks. Based on their analyzes, patterns of 
these attacks include a huge number of nonstandard packets 
larger than the standard DNS packet size which is 512 
bytes [7]. 
3. Materials and Methods 
This section presents a new attack detection system for 
DoS against DNS, which uses neural network classifier to 
detect and classify attacks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 System Architecture. 
As indicated in Fig. 1, this system gathers network data 
received by a name sever. Next the preprocessor starts 
analyzing the traffic statistically. Finally, the neural 
network classifier detects abnormal activity patterns and 
generates an alarm in the case of attack detection. It also 
has the ability to report the type of DoS attack detected. 
The statistical preprocessor receives network traffic, and 
based on an administrator specified time window extracts 
a set of statistical variables in order to reflect the network 
status. In our system, we assumed a 20s length for each 
monitoring time slice which is more than the maximum 
lookup latency. The parameters that are going to 
characterize the DNS traffic received by the name server 
and that constitute the input of the classifier are defined as 
follows: 
 
• Throughput of received DNS requests that is 
defined as the number of received bits at the 
server. We measured the average value of this 
metric for the specified time window. 
• Average size of received packets by the server 
during a monitoring time window. 
• Packet loss that is defined as the number of lost 
DNS packets that did not reach their destination 
due to the flooding attack traffic. 
 
After preprocessing the network traffic received by the 
name server, a vector of 3 parameters obtained, which will 
be the input to the neural network classifier. This type of 
classifier is widely used as an effective approach to 
classify patterns. In this article, we investigated three types 
of neural networks which are BP, RBF, and SOM neural 
networks and compared the results to find the best 
performed network to be used as an IDS. 
 
3.1 Experiments on BP neural network 
A three layered BP neural network is evaluated in this 
section. The number of the units in the input layer is equal 
to the features of input vector which in our case is three 
features of DNS traffic introduced before. There are also 
three units in the output layer representing different states 
of normal and DoS attacks: [0 0 0] for normal conditions, 
[0 0 1] for direct DoS attack and [0 1 0] for the 
amplification attack. 
 
In order to find the optimal BP classifier to fit the nature 
of the DNS intrusion detection data, several neural 
networks all different in training function and structure 
were trained and evaluated. At first, the best performed 
training function in terms of training and testing 
performance should be identified. In our experiments, a 
Levenberg-Marquardt backpropagation training function 
gives the acceptable training and testing errors. In the next 
step, different structures of BP neural networks were 
evaluated by varying the number of hidden neurons in the 
hidden layer.  We should have small training error and 
testing error while selecting moderate number of hidden 
units. After tuning the BP neural network in these 
experiments, the optimal structure of our network with 7 
neurons in the hidden layer was found. Fig. 2 & 3 show 
the DoS detection rate and accuracy of the system while 
number of hidden neurons is increasing. Performance of 
system during training and testing phases are presented in 
Fig. 4. In Fig. 5, false alarm rate of the system is presented 
while number of hidden neurons is changing from 3 to 21. 
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Fig. 2 DoS detection rate Vs. different number of hidden neurons. 
Therefore, the main assumptions considered for training 
process of BP networks are listed as follows: number of 
epochs = 500, MSE (Mean Square Error) = 0.00001, 
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training function = trainlm, activation function = tan-
sigmoid and number of neurons in the hidden layer = 7. 
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Fig 3. System accuracy Vs. different number of hidden neurons. 
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Fig 4. Mean square error of training and testing phases Vs. different 
number of hidden neurons. 
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Fig 5. False alarm rate Vs. different number of hidden neurons. 
3.2 Experiments on RBF neural network 
In order to implement the RBF network for our 
classification problem, the activation function for the 
hidden units and the centers and widths of RBFs should be 
specified. For this purpose, the centroid locations were 
determined by K-mean clustering algorithm [8] and then 
these centers were used to calculate the width (σ) value by 
the following equation: 
 
centers ofnumber 
centers 2any between  distance maximum=σ               (1) 
 
These are the mean and variance of the Gaussian 
activation function used for the RBF’s non-linear function. 
It is important that the width parameter be large enough 
that the neurons can respond to the overlapping regions of 
the input space, but too large values yield erroneously 
responses from all neurons. 
 
Because of high calculation power requirements, it is not 
possible to achieve the same MSE as BP neural networks. 
So, the value of MSE was set to 0.001. 
 
3.3 Experiments on SOM neural network 
SOM is an unsupervised neural network algorithm which 
is mainly used for dimensionality reduction. The training 
is based on the competitive rules. When a learning vector 
is put on the input of network, its distance to weight vector 
is computed. The neuron with the lowest distance becomes 
the winner. Based on the SOM network architecture, the 
winner neuron and the neurons close to it are updated 
(winner takes all). 
 
In this experiment, the input vector of three features has 
been normalized due to the large variations of input 
values. If the raw data is applied to the network directly, 
the input samples with higher values may lead to suppress 
the influence of smaller values. So, we used the standard 
normalization given by Eq. (2) was used. 
 
               
There are different number 
of neurons that were tested in order to find the best 
performed network.  The sample results are obtained by 
looking at the output of the classifier applied to the trained 
data and noticed that all normal traffic was clustered 
between a specified range and the suspicious traffic was 
outside this cluster indicating a possible attack. After the 
results show a good confidence level, the trained network 
was evaluated by subjecting it to the test data.  
 
In the first experiments, after the SOM network is trained 
using 3, 6, 25, and 40 neurons, we found that the best 
number of neurons for the SOM network is 25. Therefore, 
the SOM network parameters are considered as follows: 
number of epochs = 1000, number of neurons = 25, 
neighbors topology = Hextop, distance function = 
Linkdist, ordering phase learning rate = 0.9, ordering 
phase steps = 1000, tuning phase learning rate = 0.02 and 
tuning phase neighbor distance = 1. 
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3.4 Data set 
Data collection is usually a basic requirement for any IDS. 
The type of data that we should collect is based on the 
type of IDS. There are two approaches for normal and 
intrusion traffic simulations. One is to simulate using a 
testbed in a real environment. The other is to simulate 
using simulator softwares. When accessing to a real 
environment for traffic simulation is hard, we exploit the 
power of network simulators. According to our 
knowledge, there are no available generated dataset for 
DoS attacks against DNS. Therefore, the required data for 
our experiments was generated using a network simulator. 
Our model is simulated with an OTcl program under the 
NS-2 (version 2.28) for different DoS attacks against 
DNS. The network topology of our simulation contains a 
single legitimate client, an attacker, and two servers. All 
nodes are connected to the same router. All the links are 
100Mbps and 10ms except the link between target server 
and router that is 10Mbps and 10ms delay. A queue size of 
100 packets, with a drop-tail queuing strategy was used. 
There are two types of traffic generated in the network 
which are legitimate traffic and attack traffic. A modified 
version of Agent/Ping with a maximum of 3 
retransmissions with 5-second timeouts is used for DNS as 
implemented in [9]. The request interarrival period is fixed 
at 10s. The attacker is expected to flood the target name 
server with excess traffic. For this purpose, the DoS traffic 
is modelled as constant bit rate (CBR) source and 
currently can be generated by CBR traffic generator in 
NS-2 [10]. We chose different values of delay for 
applying to the attack start time in order to achieve 
variability. Finally, the 10-fold cross validation technique 
was used in order to provide a strong test to obtain reliable 
estimates. 
4. Results and Discussions 
In this section, the performance of each classifier in terms 
of detection rate, false alarm rate, and accuracy was 
compared. For better understanding of results comparison, 
we introduce these criteria: 
 
• Accuracy, which refers to the proportion of data 
classified as accurate type in the total data. 
Accurate situations are True Positive (TP) and 
True Negative (TN), while false detected 
situations are False Positive (FP) and False 
Negative (FN). Accuracy of the system is 
calculated by the following equation: 
 
       %100×+++
+=
FNFPTNTP
TNTPAccuracy                      (3) 
 
• Detection rate, which refers to the proportion of 
each type of DoS attack detected among all the 
same type of attack and is calculated by the 
following equation:  
 
%100×+= FNTP
TPateDetectionR           (4) 
 
• False Alarm Rate (FAR), which is defined as the 
percentage of the network traffic that is 
misclassified by the classifier. It can be calculated 
using the following equation: 
 
      %100×+= TNFP
FPFAR                    (5) 
 
Table 1 presents performance comparison of three neural 
network classifiers that have been implemented in this 
article. The results show that a BP neural network 
outperforms other types and gives a good system accuracy 
of 99% for attack detection with an acceptable false alarm 
rate. 
 
Table 1: Comparison of three neural network classifiers 
        Parameter
 
 Classifier 
 
Training 
time 
(sec) 
DR 
(direct DoS) 
DR 
(amplification 
attack) 
Accuracy FAR
BP 11.03 99.55 97.82 99 0.28
RBF 2.89 99.62 89.48 95.9 0.23
SOM 3011.87 54.24 65.28 74.40 6.83
4. Conclusions 
This paper describes two different types of DoS attacks 
against DNS and their patterns. Based on these patterns the 
required traffic data was simulated using ns-2 network 
simulator. We proposed a machine learning based system 
for detecting and classifying DoS attacks against DNS. For 
this purpose three different neural networks were 
evaluated. The results show that a three layered BP neural 
network with a 3-7-3 structure can give us 99% accuracy 
and a good classification rate for direct DoS and 
amplification attacks comparing to RBF and SOM neural 
networks.  
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